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Abstract 
Both the international financial system and Denmark were experiencing challenges in 2007 
and 2008, and they came to a head in Denmark when Roskilde Bank experienced liquidity 
pressures in June 2008. As it became clear that Roskilde Bank was insolvent and no private 
solutions would be found, and as the global financial crisis worsened leading to the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Danish government decided to take stronger action. 
To ensure the short-term survival of Roskilde Bank, the national bank issued a non-limited 
credit facility. After it passed a deposit guarantee scheme in 2008 and established a 
Financial Stability Company, the Danish government established a capital injections 
program in February 2009. This program was intended primarily to support solvent credit 
institutions so that they could stimulate the supply of credit to viable businesses and 
households. The injections took the form of subordinated debt, which Danish regulators 
considered a form of Tier 1 capital. The program recapitalized institutions up to a Tier I 
capital ratio of 12%. In 2009, 43 institutions received DKK 46 billion in capital injections at 
an average yield to maturity of 10.08%. 
Keywords: Bank Rescue Package I, Bank Rescue Package II, Capital Injections, Denmark, 
Global Financial Crisis, Guarantee Scheme  
  
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial 
Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/. 





At a Glance  
Denmark’s economy first began to slow 
in 2007, due to tight monetary 
conditions, labor shortages, and rising 
energy prices, and these problems were 
exacerbated by the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) of 2008. This manifested in 
liquidity pressures on Roskilde Bank in 
June 2008, and the Danish national bank 
decided to intervene by issuing a non-
limited credit facility. As it became clear 
that Roskilde Bank was insolvent and no 
private solutions would be found, and as 
the global crisis worsened leading to the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the 
Danish government decided to take 
stronger action. In October 2008, the 
Danish government, Financial 
Supervisory Agency (FSA), national bank, 
and private bank consortium 
(Finansrådet) passed the first of six Bank 
Packages creating an unlimited deposit 
guarantee (see Sabath) and a new state-
controlled organization to take over the 
assets of troubled banks called Finansiel Stabilitet. 
This paper focuses on the capital injections program, which is the second Bank Package of 
February 2009. The Danish Ministry of Economy and Commerce administered the 
program. The capital injection program was intended primarily to support solvent credit 
institutions so that they could stimulate the supply of credit to viable businesses and 
households. The injections took the form of subordinated debt, which the government 
considered acceptable as Tier 1 capital. The program recapitalized institutions up to a Tier 
1 capital ratio of 12%. In 2009, 43 institutions received DKK 46 billion ($7.29 billion) in 
capital injections at an average yield to maturity of 10.08%. By the end of 2010, a total of 




3 Per Yahoo Finance $1 = DKK 6.31  on July 13, 2021. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To support solvent credit institutions so that 
they can stimulate the supply of credit to businesses and 
households. 
Launch Dates  Announcement: February 3, 
2009 
Wind-down Dates Minimum three years after 
injection; no specified 
maximum 
Program Size Up to DKK 100 billion ($15.84 
billion)3 
Usage DKK 46 billion ($7.29 billion) 
Outcomes   
Ownership Structure Government-owned 
Notable Features Recapitalized to a Tier 1 
capital ratio of 12%, above the 
required 9% 
Danish Capital Injections Scheme 2009 
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Summary Evaluation 
While it is difficult to isolate the effect of this particular policy as part of Denmark’s larger 
response to combat the Global Financial Crisis, it is generally acknowledged that the capital 
injections scheme greatly improved the capital ratios of all participants. However, 
Danmarks Nationalbank acknowledged that the capital injections program, Bank Package 
II, could significantly improve banks’ solvency if the subordinated debt were converted into 
share capital. Share capital is a higher quality form of capital than subordinated debt 
because it is more readily available to bear losses and does not require regular interest 
payments. The following figure displays this projection of bank solvency in 2009 after the 
capital injections scheme was announced. 
Figure 1: Impact of Bank Package II on Bank Solvency Ratios 
 
Source: OECD 2009. 
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Denmark Context 2007–2008 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$320.01 billion in 2007 
$355.62 billion in 2008 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$58,487 per capita in 2007 
$64,322 per capita in 2008 
Sovereign credit rating (Five-year senior 
debt) 
 








Size of banking system 
 
$621.0 billion in total assets in 2007 
$750.5 billion in total assets in 2008 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
 
194.1% in 2007  
211.0% in 2008 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
 
Data not available for given years 
Five-bank concentration of banking 
system 
 
88% of total banking assets in 2007 
89% of total banking assets in 2008 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
18% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
Government ownership of banking 
system 
 
1% of banks owned by the state in 
2008 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Data not available for the time frame 
in Denmark 
Source: Bloomberg, Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends and Implications.”, World 
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset, OECD, World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database, 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: The capital injections program was the only program in the 
Bank Package II but there was a guarantee scheme (Bank Package I) already in 
place, and Bank Package II extended this guarantee further.  
Prior to the establishment of this capital injections scheme, Denmark passed Bank Rescue 
Package I in October 2008 (OECD 2009). This included a government scheme for 
participating banks that guaranteed domestic and foreign claims by depositors, debt 
holders, and creditors until September 30, 2010, though the guarantee was later extended 
to last until 2013. The guarantee covered all Danish banks that were members of the 
deposit insurance scheme and Danish branches of foreign banks that did not have such a 
scheme in their own countries. Participating banks could not pay dividends, engage in 
stock buybacks, or create new stock option arrangements. Ordinary deposits were also 
covered by an increased guarantee of DKK 750,000. Bank Package I also included a 
winding-up company, the Financial Stability Company, that could facilitate the takeover 
and resolution of insolvent banks where they could not find a private solution. The 
Financial Stability Company provided capital to help a new company wind up and take over 
a failed bank to protect debt holders and creditors; the private sector provided DKK 35 
billion to cover losses in this winding-up company. Bank Package I also implemented a ban 
on short-selling shares of Danish banks. 
Bank Package II was passed in February 2009 and established a capital injections scheme 
for which all solvent Danish credit institutions were eligible. To participate, banks issued 
subordinated debt to the government. Regulators considered subordinated debt a form of 
hybrid Tier 1 capital. Danmarks Nationalbank projected in 2009 that converting the 
subordinated debt into share capital would greatly improve the Danish banks’ core capital 
ratios (OECD 2009). Bank Package II also authorized the authorities to provide a capital 
subscription guarantee to help non-participating banks attract private investors (Denmark 
2009a). 
The Bank Rescue Package II also amended the Danish Act on Financial Stability by enabling 
individual government guarantees for non-subordinated unsecured debt and for loans 
issued for financing top-up collateral for institutions issuing særligt dækkede obligationer 
and særligt dækkede Realkreditobligationer (SDOs and SDROs) which are covered bonds 
and covered mortgage bonds respectively,  as well as Danish Ship Finance A/S (Denmark 
2009). This individual government guarantee ran up to three years and included loans 
issued through December 31, 2010. 
2. Legal Authority: The Folketing (Danish Parliament) passed the law establishing 
the capital injections scheme, and the European Commission approved 
exemption from the State Aid Rules.  
The European Commission (EC) approved the capital injections scheme pursuant to their 
State Aid policies that aim to avoid distortions of competition that may result from 
government policies (EC 2009c). Policies that constitute state aid may be approved if they 
help to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” (EC 2009a,). As 
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with many similar capital injections schemes in Europe during the GFC, the EC considered 
that the program gave beneficiaries an advantage relative to their competitors. However, as 
the capital injections program was crucial to remedying liquidity access problems in the 
economy, and supported the banking system in Denmark, the EC approved it. 
3. Governance/Administration: The Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs was 
responsible for evaluating applications for the capital injections scheme and was 
enabled to detail requirements on applications, payments, or conversion of 
shares.  
The Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs could also pass more detailed rules 
governing the amount of interest to be paid on the capital injections (Denmark 2009a). The 
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs also supervised credit institutions receiving 
capital injections, producing a report every six months on the activity of these institutions. 
4. Size, Timing: DKK 100 billion was the maximum budget for capital injections of 
hybrid core capital. A total of 50 institutions applied for DKK 63 billion, and 43 
institutions ultimately received DKK 46 billion. The capital injection was 
extended through December 20, 2009.  
Through Bank Package II, Denmark made DKK 100 billion available for capital injections of 
hybrid core capital to solvent banks and mortgage lenders, allowing them to reach a Tier 1 
capital ratio of up to 12% (Denmark 2009a). The use of the capital injections scheme by all 
eligible institutions to achieve a 12% Tier I capital ratio would have involved 
approximately DKK 100 billion (EC 2009a). A total of 50 institutions applied for DKK 63 
billion in total (OECD 2009). In 2009, 43 institutions received DKK 46 billion in capital 
injections at an average yield to maturity of 10.08% (Danmarks Nationalbank 2011). 
The amount of capital provided was decided based on the individual institution’s 
capitalization and risk profile along criteria such as basis capital, deposit deficit, liquidity 
risk, and quality and earning of credit (EC 2009a). 
Applications for the capital injections were initially accepted until June 30, 2009. On July 
10, 2009, the Danish authorities extended the time frame to perform capital injections until 
December 20, 2009, as they needed more time to review the 50 applications they had 
received (EC 2009b).  
5. Source of funding: The funds for capital injections come from the central 
government account at Danmarks Nationalbank.  
The Minister of Economic and Business Affairs, upon making an agreement with an 
institution to perform a capital injection, could use the government account at Danmarks 
Nationalbank to fund the capital injection (Denmark 2009a). 
6. Eligible institutions: The bank recapitalization scheme was voluntary and 
available to all solvent credit institutions. 
Eligible institutions were primarily bank and mortgage credit institutions that fulfilled the 
solvency requirements established by the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (EC 
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2009a). Subsidiaries of foreign banks in Denmark were also eligible if they used the capital 
injection to ensure consolidation and increase lending in Denmark (Denmark 2009a).  
Applications for capital injections required explanations of the financial institution’s 
economic situation, capital adequacy, and future projections, with an independent audit 
(EC 2009a). 
7. Individual participation limit: Institutions were recapitalized until they reached 
a Tier 1 capital ratio of 12%.  
For institutions that met the prior Tier 1 capital ratio of 9% or more, the capital injections 
scheme offered a maximum increase in Tier 1 capital of 3% up to a ratio of 12% Tier 1 
capital (Denmark 2009a; EC 2009a). Credit institutions with a Tier 1 capital ratio between 
6% and 9% were offered a capital injection to achieve a 12% Tier 1 capital ratio. 
Institutions below a 6% Tier 1 capital ratio were required to individually negotiate with 
Danish Authorities prior to applying for the capital injections scheme.  
The 12% Tier 1 capital ratio target was supported by a stress test prepared by the Danish 
National Bank based on three scenarios for the 15 largest Danish banks. This was decided 
on the basis of the Danish National Bank concluding that a Tier 1 capital ratio of 13.5% 
would allow those 15 banks to individually meet their capital needs (EC 2009a). The 
central bank said that the target 12% level would increase banks’ ability to get capital 
market funding and support the real economy. 
The stress test considered three scenarios. In the first scenario, the financial crisis would 
lead to a deep international recession, entailing lower demand for Danish products; central 
banks worldwide would adopt a more expansionary monetary-policy stance, and interest 
rates would fall. In the second scenario, the financial crisis would prompt the Danish banks 
to significantly reduce their lending; the Danish economy would experience a credit crunch. 
The third scenario was a combination of the first two scenarios, in which a deep 
international recession would coincide with a credit crunch in Denmark, causing a 
historical decline in economic activity (EC 2009a). The stress test accounted for the fact 
that banks could not pay dividends for two years due to the State guarantee issued in 
October 2008, and that the banks had to contribute to the guarantee scheme. The stress 
test modelled the pressure on bank earnings and capital adequacy that would result from 
the scenarios modeled. 
8. Capital characteristics: The program injected noncumulative, perpetual 
subordinated debt; the authorities later gave banks the option of converting the 
debt into equity.  
The capital injections took the form of perpetual subordinated debt with no voting rights 
(Denmark 2009a). Interest payments were noncumulative. Reimbursement of the injected 
capital could start after the third year at 100% of the face value plus interest but was 
subject to step-up provisions after five and seven years. After the fifth year, the instrument 
was callable at 105% of the face value plus interest, and as of the seventh year at 110%. 
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The government had no conversion rights, but the subordinated loans were transferable 
(EC 2009a).  
On July 10, 2009, the Danish authorities extended the time frame to perform capital 
injections until December 20, 2009, as they needed more time to review the 50 applications 
they had received. In addition, they made it possible for participating banks to convert their 
subordinated debt into share capital within five years of the initial injection. This was to 
enhance the quality of capital issued by participating banks under the program. The 
initially issued subordinated debt, as notified on January 23, 2009, did not fully meet 
markets’ and rating agencies’ expectations in terms of quality of capital issued and did not 
satisfy rating agencies' standards for core Tier 1 capital. With the conversion option, the 
debt would qualify as core Tier 1 capital. Therefore, by introducing this conversion option, 
Danish authorities were hoping to ensure that participating banks could maximize the use 
of capital injection for external rating purposes while minimizing changes to the authorized 
original plan (EC 2009b). 
The conversion option was available for five years after issuance and could be exercised to 
avoid the step-up provisions related to interest rates and reimbursement prices; the 
conversion option was thus an incentive for banks to convert the subordinated debt into 
ordinary shares to avoid higher payments (EC 2009b).  
Several criteria had to be met in order for a bank to exercise its conversion option and 
benefit from the higher capital quality (EC 2009b). First, the banks’ shares had to be 
trading in a regulated market. Second, the issuing bank’s total hybrid Tier 1 capital had to 
be more than 35% of its total Tier 1 capital. Third, the conversion amount at any given time 
could not exceed 20% of the original capital injection received by the bank.  
The conversion price included a 5% discount from the average share price derived over 
three working days from the conversion date, limiting the ability of issuers to use the 
conversion option to entirely avoid the step-up clauses. For the conversion option, banks 
had to pay an additional annual fee of 20 to 60 bps, as per European Central Bank (ECB) 
recommendations, to align it with the range of remuneration set up for ordinary shares. 
The European Commission (EC) verified appropriate fee levels of convertible hybrid capital 
on a case-by-case basis. The EC considered these conditions appropriate to safeguard the 
use of the capital injections scheme and avoid undue distortions of competition as required 
by the State Aid policy. 
9. Interest/Dividend: The rate charged on the capital injection was determined by a 
bank’s capitalization and risk profile. 
According to their capitalization and risk profiles, potential recipient credit institutions 
were divided into three categories which determined their interest rate (EC 2009a). Credit 
institutions in Group I (ratings of AA- or above) qualified for an interest rate of 
approximately 9%; Group II (ratings between A- and A+) qualified for an interest rate of 
approximately 9.55%; and Group III (ratings at or below BBB+) qualified for interest rates 
of approximately 11.25%. Institutions without a rating were manually sorted into one of 
these three groups based on the criteria above.  
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Four years after the capital injection, interest rates would be fixed at the greater of the 
fixed interest rate or 125% of the dividend payments to ordinary shareholders. 
The expected yearly return of these capital injections was approximately 10%, but the 
interest was noncumulative. 
10. Allocation of losses to stakeholders: In the case of bankruptcy, losses would first 
be covered by equity, then the injected subordinated debt, followed by other 
debt holders and creditors (EC 2009a).  
In the case of bankruptcy, losses would first be covered by equity, then the injected 
subordinated debt, followed by other debt holders and creditors (EC 2009a). No further 
materials relating to the motivation behind this design were found. 
11. Fate of management: There were no explicit requirements for management 
changes, although there were restrictions on management compensation.  
Executives could not receive additional share compensation even through the extension of 
previous programs (Denmark 2009a). Variable salary compensation for executive board in 
financial companies could not exceed 50% of the total basic salary including pension. 
12. Other conditions: Recipients of capital injections had to commit to promoting 
lending to the real economy and were banned from paying dividends until 2010.  
Credit institutions benefitting from capital injections also had to produce reports on their 
lending every six months that would later be consolidated and published (EC 2009a). These 
reports included information on the loans made, including the industry of the recipient, the 
share of credit to households and companies, the size of loans, and credit conditions. 
Subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions based in Denmark had to commit not to transfer 
their capital injections to their parent companies. 
Institutions receiving capital injections were banned from making dividend payments in 
2009 and 2010. They could only pay out dividends covered by their annual profits 
thereafter (EC 2009a). Until the recipient exited the capital injection program, they were 
also banned from creating stock option programs for management and from repurchasing 
stock. 
13. Exit strategy: The capital injection could be paid back after the third year at 
100% of the face value plus interest; the callable value was stepped up 
afterwards.  
The injected capital was callable at 100% starting the fourth year. After five years, it was 
callable at 105% face value plus interest, and after seven years, it was callable at 110% face 
value plus interest (EC 2009a). The Danish authorities did not have any conversion rights, 
and the recipient institutions could not reimburse their capital before the beginning of the 
fourth year. However, the Danish state could transfer the capital. The minimum waiting 
period of three years before exiting the capital injections was intended to create stability 
for recipient institutions and provide a clear incentive to lend, addressing the credit 
squeeze of the financial crisis. 
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